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In this paper we analyse a new sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime proposed in 
Katsoulacos et al. (2017), in which the penalty base is the revenue of the cartel but the 
penalty rate increases in a systematic way with the cartel overcharge. This regime formalises 
how revenue can be used as the base while taking into account the severity of the offence. In 
a homogeneous product linear demand oligopoly model we show that this hybrid regime can 
replicate the desirable welfare properties of overcharge-based penalties identified in 
Katsoulacos et al. (2015). We also demonstrate that for a wide range of parameter values a 
sophisticated revenue-based regime can be superior in its welfare impact to the overcharge-
based regime.  
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Recent literature on antitrust sanctioning focuses on the analysis of second-best monetary 
penalties. This analysis presumes that there are a variety of factors such as bankruptcy 
considerations and proportionality, which mean that penalties cannot be set so as to deter all 
or even most cartels.5 So, a proper second-best welfare comparison has to take into account 
the effects of a given penalty regime on both deterrence and on the price set by those cartels 
that do form.6 
The extensive overview of the second-best penalty regimes is contained in e.g. Bageri 
et al. (2013) or Katsoulacos et al. (2015, 2017). Bageri et al. (2013) conclude that currently 
employed revenue-based penalty regime is distortive as it induces cartel prices higher than 
those in the absence of antitrust enforcement. Katsoulacos et al. (2015) propose new 
overcharge–based penalties and show that those would allow mitigating the distortive price 
effects of revenue-based regime. Moreover they show that, taking into account both price and 
deterrence effects, overcharge–based penalties welfare-dominate the currently employed 
revenue-based penalties. However, as discussed in Katsoulacos et al. (2017), overcharge–
based penalties are subject to criticisms on the grounds of high implementation costs as their 
assessment requires information about counterfactual price and volume of sales. While 
revenue-based penalties are easy to implement as information about turnover/revenue is 
publicly observable. 
With the aim to reduce implementation problems, while retaining the desirable 
welfare properties of overcharge-based penalties, Katsoulacos et al. (2017) propose and 
analyse a sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime in which the penalty base is the 
revenue of the cartel but the penalty rate depends on the cartel overcharge. Thus, this 
proposed regime formalises how revenue can be used as the base while taking into account 
the severity of the offence. They show that this hybrid regime can replicate the desirable 
welfare properties of overcharge-based penalties, while having relatively low levels of 
implementation costs, concluding that the proposed penalty regime deserves very serious 
attention from competition authorities.  
                                                            
5Difficulties of first-best solutions in practice were discussed in e.g. Bos and Schinkel (2006), Buccirossi and 
Spagnolo (2007), Harrington (2010), Bageri et al. (2013), Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) and Houba et al. (2017). 
6See e.g. Harrington (2004, 2005), Houba et al. (2010), Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013), Katsoulacos at al. (2015) 
and  Bos et al. (2017) for theoretical analysis of the effects of various penalty regimes on cartel pricing and /or 
deterrence. The empirical analysis is provided in e.g. Levenstein and Suslow (2011, 2012, 2014), Schinkel 
(2007), Veljanovski (2007), Connor and Lande (2008), Allain et al. (2011), Boyer and Kotchoni (2015) or 
Spagnolo and Marvão (2016). 
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Katsoulacos et al. (2017) provide a detailed comparison of price and deterrence 
effects of the sophisticated revenue-based penalties to the currently employed standard 
revenue-based penalties. However, they do not compare price and deterrence effects of the 
sophisticated revenue-based penalties to the overcharge-based regime. The aim of this note is 
to provide such a comparison and to demonstrate that there exists a range of parameter values 
where the sophisticated revenue-based penalty regime is welfare superior relative to the 
overcharge-based regime. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the model. 
Section 3 provides a detailed comparison of the price effects and deterrence properties of the 
two penalty regimes and demonstrates that for a range of policy relevant parameter values a 
sophisticated revenue-based regime can be superior in its welfare impact to the overcharge-
based regime. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
The model is the repeated game model of cartel formation and pricing behaviour employed in 
Katsoulacos et al. (2015, 2017). We consider an economy comprising a range of types of 
industry, in each of which there is a homogeneous product produced by a number of firms. 
Firms have  the same constant unit costs of production. For a typical industry 0c  denotes 
the common unit costs of production and demand is given by the downward-sloping linear 
demand function ( )Q p a p  , a > c. So an industry type is characterised by , , ( )c a Q  .   
We assume Bertrand competition. So the “but-for” price, output, revenue and profit -
denoted respectively by , ,   and  B B B Bp Q R   - are given by: , ( ) ,B Bp c Q Q c a c     
= ( ) ( )BR cQ c c a c    and  0B  . Also, for a cartel to be able to effectively raise price above 
the “but-for” level all firms in an industry have to join the cartel. Mp denotes the monopoly 
price. 
If a cartel forms and sets a price p c  then the percentage overcharge is  p c c   .  
So the price is given by (1 )p c   . For any given price / overcharge set by a cartel the 




( ) (1 ) = ( (1 ))
( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( (1 ))
c Q c c a c
R c Q c c a c
     
    
   
      
   (1) 




( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
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R p p a p
   
 
     (2) 
There is a Competition Authority (CA) that investigates, discovers, prosecutes and penalises 
cartels. We focus on the following two penalty regimes:   
(a) Sophisticated Revenue-Based Penalty Regime, SR . Here the penalty base is cartel 
revenue, but now the penalty rate applied to that base is a non-decreasing linear 
function of the cartel overcharge 0SR   . So the financial penalty imposed under this 
regime will be: 
  ( ) ( )( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) SRSR SR SR
p c p a p
F c Q c or F p
c
         
 .  (3) 
(b) Overcharge-Based Penalty Regime, O . Here, as defined in Katsoulacos et al. (2015), 
the penalty base is the absolute overcharge multiplied by counterfactual output, and 
there is a penalty rate 0O   applied to that base. So the financial penalty imposed 
under this regime will be:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )O O O OF cQ c or F p p c a c       .  (4) 
Notice that under these regimes the penalty paid will vary with the cartel overcharge, which 
can either be because of the design of the regime or because of the way in which the penalty 
base varies with the overcharge.  
Let , 0 1    denote the probability that in each period a cartel is detected, 
successfully prosecuted and penalised according to one of penalty schedules specified above. 
We follow the existing literature on both the type and level of penalties and assume that β is 
independent of θ, and, moreover, its value is common knowledge. In addition, as in 
Katsoulacos et. al (2015, 2017), we assume that 1O  and 1SR  .   
 As in for example, Motta and Polo (2003) and Chen and Rey (2013) - we assume that 
cartels re-establish following a successful prosecution.7 Given this and our other assumptions, 
                                                            
7 In related work we have assumed that collusive activity can re-emerge following successful prosecution. This 
produces more complex formulae for V(.) but does not affect the main qualitative results of the paper, so we 
stick with the simpler assumption. More specifically, one can assume that, after detection, there is a constant 
probability , 0 1    that the cartel will continue in existence after detection. In this case one simply 
replaces the term (1 )n     that appears in our analysis with the more general expression 
(1 )





      
Note that with this generalization we can perform similar analysis but with 
more general expression for maximum critical level of difficulty of holding the cartel together. Then the 
unconstrained cartel overcharges under different penalty regimes will not be affected by this change, while the 
maximum critical difficulty will go down under all relevant regimes, so that the relative performance of various 
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it follows that the expected present value of profits for a single firm that is a member of a 
cartel in a given industry that has set an overcharge θ (or price p) and faces the penalty 
regime  ,r SR O  is given by 
     
   ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
r r
r r
F p F p
V or V p
n n






   (5) 
where, 2n   is the number of firms in the industry and , 0 1    is the discount factor.  As 
in Katsoulacos et al. (2015), (1 )n     denotes the intrinsic difficulty of holding the cartel 
together. For any given industry type , , (.)c a Q  there is continuum of possible industries 
 , , (.), ,c a Q  where Δ is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. 
Following standard grim-trigger strategy profile firms collude on cartel price, p, in the 
first period and continue setting p as long as no firm defects. If a firm defects from the cartel 
it sets a price below the cartel price, and, for a single period takes the entire industry profits 
Any deviation by any firm leads to competition at price c, for ever more. We also assume that 
defecting firm is immune from future prosecution by the CA.8 Then since the price set by a 
cartel could be above the monopoly price,  arg maxMp p  a defecting firm trying to 
make the maximum profits in the single period will set the monopoly price whenever the 
cartel price is above the monopoly price, but will set a price just a fraction below the cartel 
price whenever this is at or below the monopoly price,  thereby capturing the entire cartel 
profits. So defection profits are  
















 .    (6) 
For a cartel to be stable it has to satisfy the cartel stability condition: 
     ( ) drV p p .     (7) 
Then the price set by a cartel facing penalty regime, r, is that which maximises ( )rV   subject 
to 0   and the stability condition (8). We denote this by Crp . There are two cases to 
consider.  If the stability condition does not bite then: 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
penalty regimes will be unaffected. So, for the issues with which we are dealing, nothing of substance is affected 
by this more general set up. 
8Note the opposite assumption would not affect the main qualitative results of the paper. Allowing for the 
possibility of prosecuting price-deviating firms does not affect the collusive value in (6). Hence, the 
unconstrained cartel overcharges under different penalty regimes will not be affected by this change. So the 
main results about welfare advantages of the sophisticated revenue based regime compared to simple revenue-
based structure will not change. On the other hand, the cartel stability condition in (8) will be relaxed, and the 
degree of deterrence in section 3.3 will be affected but in the same direction for all the penalty regimes. 
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           ˆ arg maxC Cr r rp p p F p           (8) 
and is independent of Δ (though it depends on the industry type). On the other hand if the 
stability condition bites then Crp is the solution to 
            drp F p p     ,                (9) 
and so is a function of Δ (as well as the industry type). 
Finally, we let r be the maximum critical value of   such that, under penalty regime 
r, either the stability condition or the non-negative overcharge constraint bites.9  Clearly if 
there were no Competition Authority - and so 0   - then a cartel would always set the 
monopoly overcharge and the maximum critical value of Δ would be 1.  Whereas, once there 
is an active competition authority enforcing penalties on non-defecting cartel members we 
must have 1r  .
10 So we can define the degree of deterrence achieved by penalty regime r , 
rD , as the fraction of industries in which cartels would have formed in the absence of a 
Competition Authority in which they do not form given the presence of a Competition 
Authority operating penalty regime r. Formally: 
             1r rD     .              (10) 
Having set out the framework, we now investigate how both the cartel price and the degree of 
deterrence vary depending on which of the two penalty regimes set out above is employed by 
the Competition Authority. Our focus will be on showing that the sophisticated revenue-
based penalty regime can outperform the overcharge-based regime for a wide range of policy 
relevant parameter values.    
 
3. Analysis of the Welfare Properties  
In this section we undertake a systematic comparison of the welfare properties of a 
sophisticated revenue-based regime with those of an overcharge-based regime.  We show that 
both an overcharge-based and a linear sophisticated revenue-based penalty can achieve the 
same constant degree of deterrence across all industries. The price effects of these two 
regimes are different. We can find ranges of parameter values where sophisticated revenue-
                                                            
9 The maximum critical level of difficulty, Δ, is the direct analogue of the minimum critical discount rate used in 
much of the literature. 
10This is why we have confined attention to values of 1  . The assumption of a uniform distribution just 




based regime induces lower cartel prices and, hence under deterrence equivalence, would 
imply higher consumer surplus and higher total welfare. 
 
3.1 Cartel Pricing 
There are potentially two types of solution – those where the stability constraint (7) does not 
bite (i.e. unconstrained pricing solutions) and those in which it does (i.e. constrained pricing). 
Similar to Katsoulacos et al. (2015) we have that in every type of industry the 
unconstrained price set by a cartel under an overcharge-based regime, O , is below the 
monopoly price, i.e. ˆ C MOp p . More specifically, unconstrained cartel price under an 
overcharge-based regime is obtained by maximizing ( )OV p  with respect to p. Recall ( )OV p  
is given by  
     
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) OO
p c a p p c a c
V p




So we have 





a c a c a c
p p c a p p c a c p
                     (11) 
Next, taking into account that ˆ C MOp p , expressions in (6) and (7) imply that under an 
Overcharge-Based Regime the cartel stability condition is given by 
  
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )dOO
p c a p p c a c
V p p c a p p
         

 
This implies that 
     
( )
(1 )




.               (12) 
This expression is a special case of expression (21) in Katsoulacos et al. (2015) for the case 
of linear demand. This upper bound on p is a decreasing function of Δ taking the value c 
when 1 1O    . So there will be a range of values of Δ for which the stability condition 
bites and constrains the cartel price. So under this penalty regime the overall cartel price is 
             
( )





p MIN p a
 
 
         
           (13) 
 
Next, following Katsoulacos et al. (2017) we can show that the unconstrained price set by a 
cartel under a linear sophisticated revenue-based regime is below the monopoly price, i.e. 
ˆ C MSRp p . More specifically, unconstrained cartel price under a sophisticated revenue-based 
regime is obtained by maximizing ( )SRV p  with respect to p. Recall ( )SRV p  is given by  
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p c p a p
p c a p
cV p





So we have  ˆ arg max ( )( ) ( ) ( )CSR SR
p
p c p c a p p c p a p      . And, hence, we obtain 
     221ˆ 1
3 3 3 2
C M
SR SR SR SR SR
SR SR
a c c a c
p c a a c c p   
 
 
            
 
   (14) 
By substituting (2)-(3) into (7) we obtain the cartel stability condition under a Sophisticated 
Revenue-Based Penalty Regime, and can consider to what extent this constrains the cartel 
overcharge. Under a Sophisticated Revenue-Based Penalty Regime the cartel price is below 
the monopoly price and so (7) becomes: 
  
( )
( )( ) ( )





p c a p p a p




   














.                           (15) 
This upper bound on p is a linear decreasing function of Δ, which takes the value c when 
1 1SR    . So there will be a range of values of  , for which the upper bound in (15) 
lies below the unconstrained price ˆ CSRp  and so the cartel stability condition bites and 
constrains the price that the cartel can set.  But then the overall cartel price under a this 
Sophisticated Revenue-Based penalty regime is: 
       
 1
ˆ , , 0 1 1C CSR SR SR
SR
c
p MIN p 

 




.             (16) 
 
So the cartel stability condition constrains the overcharge that cartels set for both the 
Sophisticated Penalty Regime and the Overcharge-Based Penalty Regime. However, without 
specifying parameter values it is impossible to determine whether the price – either 
unconstrained or constrained - is higher under one regime than the other. The comparison 
depends on the shape and the structure of the demand function and on the parameters of the 
penalty functions. In Figure 1 below we illustrate the case where cartel overcharge under a 
Sophisticated Revenue-Based Penalty Regime (solid line) is below that under an Overcharge-





Figure 1: Comparison of Cartel Overcharge Under Sophisticated Revenue-Based Penalty Regime 
(solid line) and Cartel Overcharge Under Overcharge-Based Penalty Regime (dotted line). 
Sophisticated Revenue-Based Penalty Regime welfare dominates Overcharge-Based Penalty Regime 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Cartel Overcharge Under Sophisticated Revenue-Based Penalty Regime 
(solid line) and Cartel Overcharge Under Overcharge-Based Penalty Regime (dotted line) 
 
3.2 Deterrence equivalence and welfare comparison 
From the analysis in the previous sub-section we see that the maximum critical level of 
difficulty of holding a cartel together, r , is determined as the value at which the constrained 
price is driven to c (or equivalently constrained overcharge is driven to zero) for both the 
Sophisticated Revenue-Based Regime and the Overcharge-Based Regime. 
From (12) and (15) we immediately have:   
 




Consequently from (10) the degree of deterrence achieved by each of the penalty regimes is:  
 
( ) ; ( )SR SR O Oi D ii D   .    (18) 
 
Analysis of (18) implies that that the degree of deterrence achieved by a Sophisticated 
Revenue-Based Penalty Regime is equal to the toughness of the regime – i.e. the probability 
of successful prosecution multiplied by SR  the constant rate at which the penalty rate is 
increased with the overcharge. Similarly, the degree of deterrence achieved by an 
Overcharge-Based Regime is equal to the toughness of this regime – i.e. the probability of 
successful prosecution multiplied by the penalty rate. Moreover, if O SR     then the two 
regimes will be equally tough and the common degree of deterrence achieved by each of 
these regimes will be the same (i.e. regimes will be deterrence equivalent). So that the 
fraction of cartels deterred is exactly the same across both regimes. 
Since both the Sophisticated Revenue-Based regime and the Overcharge-Based Regime 
achieve the same degree of deterrence across all industries, we can get exact deterrence 
equivalence industry by industry between these two regimes when penalty rates are equal, i.e. 
when O SR    . This will allow direct comparison of the welfare effects of these two 
regimes. Under deterrence equivalence welfare comparison can be done through comparison 
of unconstrained and constrained overcharges. The results of this comparison are presented in 
Proposition 2. 
Proposition 1: If we impose deterrence equivalence, i.e. SR O    , then  






























   
          
 
    
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Comparison of  expressions in (11) and (14) under deterrence 












for a we have p p
c c






















  for ˆ ˆC CSR Op p .  Further, we have 
to analyse two cases: 1) 5a c  and 2) 2 5c a c  . If 5a c , then ˆ ˆC CSR Op p  for all 































 . Then if at the point where 1     the derivative 
(slope) of the linear function in (15) is smaller in absolute value than the slope of the function 
in (12) we should also have that the overall prices , 0 1C CSR Op p for all      . 











. The analysis of expressions in (12) and (15) adds the third case: 3) 
2c a c  . In this case we have that overall prices C CSR Op p  for all 0 1  . This 
completes the proof of Proposition 2.  ■ 
This proposition implies that when demand parameter a is sufficiently higher than 
unit cost c, i.e. when 5a c , the overall cartel price under the sophisticated revenue-based 
regime is below that under the overcharge-based regime for any level of the toughness 
0 1  , i.e. for any parameters of the penalty function. This case is illustrated in Figure 1 
above. Also when a takes intermediate values, i.e.  2 5c a c  , the overall cartel price under 
the sophisticated revenue-based regime can be below that under the overcharge-based regime 








. So, in the above 
mentioned circumstances the sophisticated revenue-based regime welfare dominates the 
overcharge-based regime. Only for the range of low levels of demand parameter a , i.e. when 
2c a c  , the price implied by the overcharge-based regime will be unambiguously lower 
than that implied by the sophisticated revenue-based regime for all. 
Using the expressions for overall cartel prices derived in section 3.1 and assuming 
that Δ is uniformly distributed on [0,1], we can calculate the average overcharge, the average 
consumer surplus, and the average total welfare associated with any penalty regime.  These 
are given by 
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   
1
0
( ) , ( )O F p F d c                     (19)
   
1
0
( ) , ( )CS F CS p F d                     (20) 
   
1
0
( ) , ( )TW F TW p F d                     (21) 
This gives us the following proposition: 
Proposition 2:  If we impose deterrence equivalence  i.e. SR O    , then when 








 we have 
(i)    SR OO O   
(ii)    SR OCS CS   
(iii)    SR OTW TW  . 
Proof of Proposition 2:  (i) follows by using (13) and (16) and integrating over all [0,1] .  
(ii) and (iii) follow by noting that consumer surplus and total welfare are strictly decreasing 
functions of cartel price.  ■ 
This proposition implies that, when demand parameter a is sufficiently high, i.e. 









the sophisticated revenue-based regime welfare dominates the overcharge-based regime. 
Only for the range of low levels of demand parameter a , i.e. 2c a c  , the overcharge-
based regime will unambiguously welfare dominate the sophisticated revenue-based regime 
independent of the toughness of the penalty regimes 
 
4. Conclusions 
We analyse homogeneous product linear demand oligopoly model with price competition and 
demonstrate that sophisticated revenue-based penalties, in which the penalty rate that is 
applied to revenue rises linearly with the level of overcharge, can welfare-dominate the 
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